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Wilderness Water Rights: The Status of Reserved 
Rights After the Tarr Opinion 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, two major conflicting opinions affecting federal reserved 
water rights for wilderness areas were released. The opinions may sig-
nificantly alter federal water policy for statutory wilderness lands. 
On July 26, 1988, Ralph Tarr, Solicitor of the Interior Depart-
ment released Opinion M-36914 (Supp. 111).2 It was followed within a 
few weeks by the final judgment in the federal court decision that 
prompted the Tarr Opinion, Sierra Club v. Lyng. 3 The nriginal Sierra 
Club decision was rendered in November of 1985, and conflicts directly 
with the Tarr Opinion. 4 Sierra Club was the first case to hold that the 
reservatic1'n doctrine6 applied to wilderness areas and caused great con-
cern among western water users. The Sierra Club sued for de-claratory 
relief, seeking a finding that certain wilderness areas in Colorado were 
entitled to federal reserved water rights, and asking that the court com-
pel federal officials to assert these rights.6 The court found that the 
wilderness areas in question were reservations of land, and that new 
water rights vested with these reservations.' The water rights "wild 
card" had been played.8 
1. This paper was awarded the first place in the American B;11 A<soriation Natural 
Resources Section 1989 Writing Competition. 
2. _ Interior Dec. __ (July 26, 1988). [hereinafter Tarr Opinion j On the "1me date, 
the U.S. Attorney General issued an opinion letter affirming the Tarr Opinion. 
3. Sierra Club v. Lyng, No. 84-M-2, (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 1 ')88) (Order for· Entrv of Final 
Judgment). 
4. This case was originally decided by Judge John 1.. Kane, .1uh nom .'iie1-ra Club,._ Block, 
622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985) [hereinafter Sierra Club]. In the interim pcriud an appeal was 
filed. and subsequently dismissed for lack of a final order, Sierra Club v. Lvng. :\n %-11 )3, slip 
op. at 4-5 (10th Cir. Oct. 8, 1986). On June 3, 1987, the District Court entered an order reaf-
firming the order that the Forest Service submit a plan for protecting wilderness water resources, 
rejecting a three-page plan that had been submitted in response to the prior order. ~irrra Club v. 
Lyng 661 F. Supp 1490, 1501 (D. Colo. 1987) [hereinafter Sierra Cluh li j On ~cptember 27. 
1987, a new plan was submitted. This plan was affirmed on ~eptembn ">ll. 19KS and J udgc 
Richard P. Matsch entered an order making Judge Kane's decision of NovcmiH'r 25, I 'lil\ a final 
order. 
S. For an explanation of the reservation doctrine 1 see infra notes 24-_V:; ,md ~H·nHHp::mying 
text. 
6. 622 F. Supp. at 845-46. 
7. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. 
8. f. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STAn: Rt:LATIONS IN WATER LAW 160 (10'71). Jlc;1n Trekase 
foresaw a Sierra Club-type action and described wilderness reserved wate1· rir.;hts as a "wild rani 
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This comment considers the history of the reservation doctrine and 
the judicial standards developed for its application. It analyzes the rea-
soning of Sierra Club, its potential impact, and the opinion's flaws. 
The comment explores the logic of the Tarr Opinion and suggests it as 
a foundation for appellate review of Sierra Club. Further, this com-
ment considers the reservation doctrine as applied to wilderness areas. 
Finally, a legislative solution is proposed that would resolve further 
controversy concerning federal reserved rights for all prospective wil-
derness areas. 
A. Western Water Allocation 
All western states employ some form of the appropriation system 
for perfection of water rights. The principal rule is "first in time, first 
in right."9 The water right is severed from the land and independently 
administered. Generally, a diversion from the water flow is required, 
although some statutes recognize instream flow rights. The water ap-
propriated must be put to beneficial use. Traditionally, legally recog-
nized beneficial uses included farming, mining, domestic, or stockwater-
ing. Many states have adopted laws reflecting an expanded view of 
beneficial uses. 10 
Federal reserved rights may interfere with a well-ordered state 
water allocation system because they are not perfected and quantified 
under the state system. When a withdrawal and reservation of public 
land is made, there is an implied water right sufficient to accomplish 
the primary purposes of the reservation. 11 This dormant reserved water 
right imposes uncertainty upon economic development as the state plans 
for its future water needs. Because the federal right is guaranteed as a 
reserved right, the federal government need not participate in state 
court adjudications of water flows. Effective adjudication is impossible 
when all interested parties are not compelled to join the proceeding. 12 
that can be played at any time," and a "blank check" waiting to be written. Trelease used other 
colorful language in his writing, also terming the wilderness reserved right as a Damoclean sword. 
However, in later years, he began a quiet retreat, abandoning the view that the reserved rights 
threaten water rights stability. See, e.g., Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 
54 DE:">/. L. J 473, 492 (1977). 
9. 1 W. Ht'TC:HINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTF.RN STATES, 14, 366 (1971). 
10. See, e.g., LTAH Com: ANN. § 73-3-29 (Supp. 1988) (public recreational use, preserva-
tion of aquatic wildlife, conservation of water); CAL WATER Com: § 1243 (West 1988) (recrea-
tion, preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife). 
11. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) and notes 53 through 62 and accom-
panying text, infra. 
12. An adjudication is a declaratory class action brought under state law in which all claim-
ants of water rights present their claims. A book is generally published with the judgment which 
quantifies and qualifies each claimant's right in the subject water source. 
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Many view Sierra Club as an unwarranted federal incursion because it 
further expands the reservation doctrine. In direct conflict with the 
holding in Sierra Club, the Tarr Opinion concludes that wilderness 
designation under the Wilderness Act does not reserve lands. 13 
B. The Beaver Dam Mountains Wilderness: The Next Battleground? 
The Beaver Dam Mountains Wilderness area, located on the Ari-
zona strip of Utah and Arizona, is one of very few designated wilder-
ness areas currently undergoing water rights resolution. 14 This area is 
part of a larger wilderness area known as the Paiute-Beaver Dam 
Mountain Wilderness Area, adjacent to the Virgin River Gorge. 111 The 
water rights adjudication involving the Beaver Dam Wilderness Area 
has been underway in the Utah District Court in St. George for the 
past seven years. 16 The Tarr Opinion has effectively stopped all action 
in the general determination, as the Justice Department considers its 
next move. The Justice Department finds itself directed by the Solicitor 
of the Interior Department not to assert reserved water rights, while 
ordered by Sierra Club to advance reserved right claims. 17 
The Beaver Dam adjudication is the first water adjudication 
where the Justice Department must claim some rights, and yet is obli-
gated to refrain from asserting reserved rights under the Tarr Opinion. 
Several extensions for the claims deadline have been granted to the 
United States. 18 All rights of the parties are in limbo. The claims rec-
ord has been printed and prepared for distribution, but it has been 
ordered withheld from distribution by the Utah Attorney General, 
pending action by the Justice Department. 19 As of this writing, no 
claim has been filed by the United States for water rights within the 
13. Tarr Opinion at 2-3. 
14. In the Matter of General Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, Both Surface and 
Cnderground, \Vithin the Drainage Area of the Virgin River, No. 7596-Civ (5th Dist. Ct., Wash. 
Co., Utah 1988) [hereinafter General Determination]. 
15. The area was designated as a wilderness area by the Arizona Wilderness Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-406, 98 Stat. 1493 ( 1984 ), codified at 16 U.S. C. § 1132 (Supp. II 1984). The 
Beaver Dam :-.lountains are drained by the Virgin River, located in the southwest corner of the 
state. The Virgin River, along with the Santa Clara River and La Verkin Creek, drains the Pine 
Vallev mountains and Zion National Park. 
16. See supra note 14, General Determination. 
17. While the district court in Sierra Club recognized a federal reserved water right under 
the Wilderness Act, the court also found that it was powerless to compel the federal defendants to 
pursue these claims. See Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985). 
18. See supra note 14, General Determination, Motion for Enlargement of Time Within 
Which to File Water Rights Claims for the Beaver Dam Mountains Wilderness Area (Div. No. 
3.), filed Sept. 9, 1988. 
19. Telephone interview with Gerald Stoker, Superintendent, Southern Ctah Office. Ctah 
Div. of Water Rights (Cedar City, Utah), Oct. 3, 1988. 
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wilderness area. 20 The Secretary of the Interior has suggested that the 
Justice Department file an application for future water rights under 
Utah state law. 21 
II. HISTORY OF RESERVED RIGHTS 
A. The Winters Decision 
The genesis of federal reservation of water doctrine is United 
States v. Winters, 22 a case involving an Indian reservation. 23 The re-
served rights doctrine is a policy determination that lands set aside as 
reservations should have the water needed to fulfill the purpose of the 
reservation. Because many of the lands reserved by the government pre-
date various water appropriations, a conflict of priority arises when the 
government exercises the doctrine. 24 
In lVinters, the Indians had ceded large tracts of land to the fed-
eral government, which then opened the land to homesteading. The 
homesteaders perfected water rights by appropriations from the Milk 
River under Montana law. After some years, the reservation Indians 
began an agricultural project and diverted large amounts of water for 
irrigation. The homesteaders, believing that their rights were superior, 
made new diversions to obtain their water. The new diversions were 
upstream from the Indian project, severely decreasing their water sup-
ply. The Supreme Court granted a senior right to the Indians. The 
Court observed the "first ir. time, first in right" rule, allowing the Indi-
ans to relate the priority of their right back to the time of the reserva-
tion of the land, which was prior to any homesteader claim. 
B. Winters r~·xpanded: Water Rights for All Reservations 
For many years, everyone assumed that the Winters doctrine ap-
plied only to Indian reservations. 25 This view was strongly reinforced 
20. W:l!cr righh have been claimed for the federal government under state law procedure for 
othn Bun",Ju of Land \lana~nnent lands. See supra note 14, General Determination. 
21 Letter from llonald P. Hodel, Secretary of the Interior, to Edwin Meese III, Attorney 
General (July 26. l'!HS). A copy is on file at the office of the Journal of Public Law. 
22. 2tl' Tr S "(,.j I 10081. 
23. lh· rc"·n:t:ion doctrine first appeared in dicta in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & 
Irrigation C<>., J 74 l '.S 690, 703 (1899). The Court stated that the individual states may not 
ckstmy. thmugh kgislation. the riparian rights of the United States, at least so far as may be 
necessary for the beneficia! uses of the governmental property. The reservation doctrine is com-
monly rein red to as tl!c \\'inters doctrine. 
~4. See generally Comment, Federal Reserved Water Rights in National Forest Wilderness 
,\ reas, XX I LA'- I> & \\.A rFR L. RF.v. 380, 386 ( 1987). 
25. SN, e.g., Trt'iea5e, Federal Resrmed Water Rights Since the PLLRC, 54 DEN. lJ.L. 
RIV. 47.1, 47'i ( 1977). 
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in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.26 
However, in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 27 (the Pelton Dam 
decision), the Supreme Court held that a designation of land for partic-
ular purposes severed the water on that land from appropriation under 
state control. 28 The Court limited its holding to reservations for a par-
ticular purpose, thus not applying the holding to all public lands in 
general. This distinction was short-lived; eight years later the Winters 
doctrine was extended to fish and game refuges, national forests and 
recreation areas. 29 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has emphasized the narrow 
nature of the reserved rights doctrine. In 1976, the Court held in Cap-
paert v. United States80 that reserved rights extend only to the mini-
mum amount of the unappropriated water that is necessary to accom-
plish the purpose of the reservation. The Court stated: 
[W]hen the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public 
domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by im-
plication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the ex-
tent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing, 
the United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water 
which vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights 
of future appropriators ... [O]nly that amount of water necessary to 
fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more, [shall be reserved].31 
Cappaert extended the Winters doctrine specifically to ground water, 
giving protection to the water level of a pool in Devil's Hole Cavern, 
part of the Death Valley National Monument.82 
Following Cappaert, in United States v. New Mexico, 38 the Su-
preme Court examined the reserved rights for instream flows, recrea-
tion, and stockwatering in national forests. 84 The Court held that the 
26. 295 U.S. 142, 159 (1935). The Supreme Court held that the Desert Land Act of 1877, 
43 U.S.C. §§ 321-29 (1982), applied the appropriation doctrine to all non-navigable water sources 
in the public domain. This was viewed as a confirmation of the federal policy of recognizing only 
appropriative claims perfected under state law. 
27. 349 U.S. 435 (1955). 
28. /d. at 444. 
29. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). 
30. 426 U.S 128 (1976). 
31. /d. at 138, 141. 
32. !d. at 139-40. 
33. 438 U.S. 696 ( 1978). 
34. The government argued that the extent of the purposes of the federal reservation, 
whatever they may be, should govern the extent of the reserved water rights. The government also 
claimed that subsidiary purposes, such as minimum stream flow for fire and erosion protection, 
which support the primary purposes (improving and protecting the forests) should also be subjects 
of reserved rights. Brief for the United States at 22, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 
(1978). 
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intent of Congress in passing the legislation authorizing a reservation 
would be controlling. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion reiterated 
the general rule of deference to state law.35 The presumption in favor 
of state water policy would be overcome only after meticulous study of 
"both the asserted water right and the purposes for which the land was 
reserved". 36 
III. WILDERNESS WATER: A RESERVED RIGHT? 
A. The History of Wilderness Lands 
In 1891, Congress authorized the PresidePt to establish national 
forests. 37 The primary purposes of the national forest reserves were to 
"improve and protect the forest within the reservation, or for the pur-
pose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a 
continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of the citizens of 
the United States."38 The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision 
to establish two primary purposes for national forests: conservation of 
water flows and protection of timber. 39 
Congress did not mandate any particular means of forest manage-
ment. The concept of wilderness areas first appeared in 1928, when the 
Secretary of Agriculture authorized the Forest Service to designate cer-
tain areas of forests where no construction or occupancy would be per-
mitted, except as specifically authorized by the Secretary or the Chief 
of the Forest Service.'0 No real direction was provided to the Forest 
Service in designating and administering newly-created wilderness ar-
eas. Water rights were not even mentioned in the enabung regulations. 
The regulations merely instructed that primitive conditions of the envi-
ronment be maintained within the zone designated as a "primitive 
area."41 Being administrative orders, the wilderness designations under 
35. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978). 
36. !d. at 700. 
37. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1103 (subsequently repealed). 
38. Organic Administration Act, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 35 (1897). 
39. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707 (1978). 
40. Regulation L-20 of the Department of Agriculture, quoted in H.R. REP. No. 2521, 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1962). This House Report contains a succinct history of the development of 
the wilderness concept in the 20th century. 
41. For an excellent history of early Forest Service action on wilderness concerns, as well as 
a background for the introduction of the numerous wilderness bills which preceded the Wilderness 
Act of 1962, see j. HENDEE, WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT (1978). Regulation L-20 survived only 
ten years, when it was replaced by Regulations U-1 and U-2. These regulations provided for the 
establishment of "wild" and "wilderness" areas. Logging and road construction were prohibited, 
and the areas were distinguished on the basis of size. Regulations U-1 and U-2 of the Department 
of Agriculture, quoted in H.R. REP. 2521, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1962). It was these regula-
tions that were employed in establishing wilderness areas until the passage of the Wilderness Act 
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these regulations were subject to reversal or modification by subsequent 
administrations. Seeking permanent protection, congressional efforts 
were directed toward enacting wilderness legislation, culminating in the 
introduction of over sixty bills during the 1950s.42 
The Wilderness Act of 196443 stated that its purposes were recrea-
tional, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation and historical. The 
Act contains restrictions on the building of permanent roads, use of mo-
tor vehicles, and construction of permanent structures. Water projects 
are allowed upon authorization of the President, but only after study 
and a determination that approval of such projects would better serve 
the interests of the United States than would the denial. 44 
B. Wilderness Lands: A Withdrawal and Reservation? 
A finding that a designation of land for a specific purpose consti-
tutes a withdrawal from disposal and reservation for the sp~cific pur-
pose is the threshold issue for application of the reservation doctrine.4~ 
Public domain lands are available for sale if they have not been "with-
drawn."46 However, a withdrawal from disposal availability may not 
accomplish a reservation. A reservation must be expressed in legislative 
or executive action which establishes the purpose for which the land is 
to be dedicated.47 Some examples include national parks, monuments 
and forests. 48 
A review of the literature criticizing implied reserved rights under 
the Wilderness Act of 1964 shows that no commentator or scholar has 
contended that the Act did not withdraw and establish a reservation of 
lands. 49 Nonetheless, recognizing reservation as the threshold issue, 
Judge Kane took great pains in Sierra Club to establish that the Act 
in 1964. Pub. L. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964), codified at 16 U.S C §§ 1131-36 (1982). These 
regulations were also silent on the nature of water rights for the designated wilderness areas. The 
presumption seems to have been that the water rights appurtenant to the national forest lands, 
from which the wilderness area was created, would remain in force, simply preserving the status 
quo. 
42. J. HENDEE, supra note 41 at 64. 
43. 16 us.c. § 1133(b) (1982) 
44. /d. at § (d)(4). 
45. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-60 (1963); Cappaert v. United States, 
426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). 
46. Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 444 ( 1955 ). 
47. United States v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo. 1982) ("Reserved lands 
are those ... withdrawn from the public domain by statute, executive order, or treaty, and are 
dedicated to a specific federal purpose"). 
48. /d. 
49. See, e.g., Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Sinre PLLRC, 54 DEN. L. J. 473 
(1977); Robinson, Wilderness: The Last Frontier, 59 MINN. L. Rt:v. 1 (1975). 
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accomplished a valid reservation of land for a public purpose.110 The 
language of the Wilderness Act of 1964 emphatically lists the public 
purposes for which the lands are to be used. 111 The terms of the Act 
lead to the logical conclusion that Congress intended a reservation. 52 
Further, Sierra Club cites numerous excerpts from legislative debates 
where the term "reservation" is employed.53 The finding of a reserva-
tion is well supported, while there is no authority for a contrary 
finding. 
C. The Purposes Test of United States v. New Mexico 
An express reservation for a public purpose is a prerequisite for a 
reserved water right. 54 United States v. New Mexico55 established a test 
centered on congressional purposes for establishing the subject reserva-
tion.56 Absent language of an express reservation of water rights, the 
examining court must find a primary purpose requiring a water right. 
The Supreme Court construed the Organic Act of 1897 to institute 
two primary purposes for national forest lands. These purposes are to 
promote growth of a steady supply of timber and to conserve water 
flows. 57 The Court determined that the MUSYA58 established only sec-
ondary purposes. 119 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated: 
"where water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation .. 
. there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended ... that the 
United States would acquire water in the same manner as any other 
50. 622 F. Supp. 842, 854-55 (D. Colo. 1985). His was the first court to consider the issue. 
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1982). 
52. 622 F. Supp. at 856 ([W]ilderness areas shall be devoted to the public purposes of recre-
ation, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation and historic use (emphasis added)). 
53. /d. at 856-57, (citing 110 CoNG. REc. 5885, 17,443, 17,448, 17,437, 17,435 (all quoting 
various Congressmen calling for a reservation of lands for wilderness uses)). 
54. 622 F. Supp. at 855. 
55. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
56. /d. at 707-08. The New Mexico decision involved a dispute over water rights for the Gila 
National Forest in New Mexico. The controversy began with a state court w3ter rights adjudica-
tion for the waters of the Rio Mimbres River. The federal government asserted reserved rights for 
recreational uses, stockwatering, and wildlife preservation. These claims were based on the origi-
nal Forest Service enabling act, The Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 473, and the Multiple-Use 
Sustained Yield Act of 1960 [hereinafter MUSY A], 16 U.S. C. § 528 ( 1982). The government 
argued that these two acts provided express evidence of congressional intent to reserve water for 
these purposes. On appeal from the Supreme Court of New Mexico, the Supreme Court affirmed 
a decision denying reserved water rights for secondary purposes. 438 U.S. at 714. The Court 
found that wildlife propagation, recreation, aesthetics and stockwatering were all secondary 
purposes. 
57. 438 U.S. at 707. 
58. See supra note 56. 
59. 438 U.S. at 714. 
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public or private appropriator."80 Thus congressional intent to reserve 
water rights will not be implied when the purposes are secondary in 
nature. 61 
The New Mexico Court considered a claim for instream flow pres-
ervation. 62 Similar concerns arise in the wilderness context. Should one 
conclude that Congress intended to reserve a wilderness water right, the 
question of quantification arises. Following the purposes test of New 
Mexico, one must consider the primary purpose of the wilderness reser-
vation. The purposes of the Wilderness Act of 1964 are directed at 
preserving the wilderness character of the land 
[W]here the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, 
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain ... retaining its 
primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements 
or human habitation ... protected and managed so as to preserve its 
natural conditions ... with the imprint of man's work substantially 
unnoticeable.68 
Terms such as those listed in the Wilderness Act would lead a 
court to conclude that "untrammeled by man" means just that. This 
would in turn prevent any alteration of the full natural stream flow, 
whether that alteration be the storage of flood waters or appropriation 
of water for a beneficial use. The terms of the Act make no provisions 
for a lesser quantity, notwithstanding the likelihood that the wilderness 
flora and wildlife might well be maintained with a reduced instream 
flow. Indeed, while not likely, strict application of the purposes test 
would prevent even temporary diversion of water for forest fire 
suppression. 
D. From The Wilderness Fuller Purpose: Impairment of Existing 
Rights 
Assuming both that a reserved wilderness water right exists, and 
that the purposes of the Wilderness Act are literally interpreted, many 
perfected water rights are at risk of reduction, or perhaps elimination. 
While most wilderness areas are located in high country, generally the 
home of stream headwaters, some wilderness areas are subject to in-
holdings.8• Future expansion of the national wilderness system is likely 
60. /d. at 702. 
61. /d. at 715. 
62. /d. at 713-15. 
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (c) (1982). 
64. See, e.g., Forest Service Report on Protecting Wilderness Water Resources, filed with the 
U. S. District Court for Colorado in Sierra Club v. Lyng, 84-K-2 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 1987). 
Twenty of the twenty-four wilderness areas within Colorado contain inholdings (privately-owned 
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to include roadless areas located downstream from senior appropria-
tors.66 The Beaver Dam Mountain Wilderness Area is one such area. 
In these cases, the wilderness reserved right may have a degree of con-
trol over the upstream appropriators, even those senior in right. 
Hydro-electric projects and reservoirs are found on nearly every 
stream of appreciable size in the West. A reserved right to the full 
natural flow of a stream holds the potential of impairing upstream 
water development projects. As water demand increases, planners will 
undoubtedly look to the high mountain canyons. These narrow, deep 
canyons often are suitable for low-cost dam construction, resulting in 
lower cost water storage.66 Moreover, these lands are usually still in the 
public domain, reducing the cost of purchase or easement for the devel-
oping agency. If the wilderness is located near or at the headwaters, 
development is blocked by virtue of the Wilderness Act. 67 On the other 
hand, if the wilderness area is downstream the right to a full natural 
flow may heavily restrict the ability to manage flows, and render inef-
fectual any development plans. 
A wilderness area may even carry a priority date earlier than 
1964, the year of passage of the Wilderness Act. Many wilderness ar-
eas were created from land previously administratively designated as 
"primitive."68 For example, Aldo Leopold, while a district forester, 
classified areas within the Gila National Forest as "wilderness."69 
Those areas are now designated as wilderness under the Wilderness 
Act. 70 A court may view a <.::ontemporary wilderness designation as con-
gressional ratification of the administrative classification. The result 
might well be that the court would then grant a priority date related 
back to the first administrative classification of the land as wilderness 
tracts within the borders of a wilderness area). Brief in Support of Sierra Cluh's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 20 n 12, Sierra Club v. Block, No. 84-K-2, filed June 10, 1985. 
65. Congress has charged the Bureau of Land Management [BLM] to conduct the Roadless 
Area Review and Evaluation [RARE] studies to identify areas under that agency's control which 
might be candidates for wilderness designation. This order came under the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act [FLPMA], and carries a target date of 1991. 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982). The 
BLM was created in 1946, much later than the National Park Service and Forest Service. 43 
U.S.C. § 1731 (1982). Being a relatively young agency, the BLM administers the lands not al-
ready assigned to other federal agencies, such as the Park Service or Forest Service. Many of these 
lands are located away from the high forest areas, and certainly will have upstream prior 
appropriations. 
66. See Abrams, Water In The Western Wilderness: The Duty To Assert Reserved Water 
Rights, 1986 U ILL. L. REv. 387, 390. 
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4) (1982). The Act requires Presidential approval for water devel-
opment projects located within wilderness areas. To date, it appears that this approval has never 
been granted. 
68. See supra, note 41 and accompanying text. 
69. Robinson, Wilderness: The Last Frontier, 59 MINN. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (197S). 
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982). 
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or pnm1t1ve. In Arizona v. California the Court determined that a 
reserved right may be implied from administrative action.71 The end 
result is that during times of drought, a junior appropriator may be left 
without any water. 
Aside from an early priority date, the imposition of a wilderness 
reserved right onto a well-ordered appropriation system would wreak 
havoc. Western water rights are relatively settled. To introduce a blank 
check "not on record, [and] not fixed in size ... "72 into water rights 
already determined under state law requires a reallocation of all previ-
ously adjudicated rights. 
A common feature of a prior appropriation system is the "no-
harm" rule. 73 A senior appropriator may not change his point of diver-
sion, or transfer his water right, if other appropriators will be harmed. 
Should an upstream water development project alter the flow through 
the wilderness area, by moving the point of diversion from downstream 
to upstream, the wilderness right would hold a veto power over the 
water development project. 74 This is true even if the party changing the 
point of diversion holds a senior right, and even if less than a full natu-
ral instream flow is needed for the propagation of fish, animal and 
plant life. 
In its report to the district court in Sierra Club, the Forest Service 
raised the next factor related to a reserved water right. It questioned 
whether the cost of quantification would be proportionate to any threat 
to the wilderness area water supply.75 The agency administering the 
wilderness area would have the burden of establishing quantification of 
the water right in any state water proceeding. The Forest Service re-
port points to the hard costs of hydrological study, as well as the time 
required for such studies and then their agency's evaluation.76 
71. 373 US. 546, 598-601 (1963). See also Cappaert \'.United States, 426 US. 128, 139-40 
(1976) 
72. Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since the PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473, 474 
(1977). 
73. See, e.g., UTAH Com ANN. § 73-3-3 (Supp. I ')88); W. HtrTCHINS, supra note 9 at 625. 
74. These consequences would not necessarily, and likely not at all, be the result if no wil-
derness reserved right exists. If, as in the majority of cases, the wilderness area had been carved 
from forest reservation, all that would he required is a quantity of water sufficient to fulfill the 
primary purposes of the forest reservation. The no-harm rule would then be satisfied, barring 
other complications. 
75. Report on Methods for Protecting Wilderness Water Resources on Lands in Colorado, 
Sierra Club,._ Block, l\'o. 84-K-D, filed Sept. 22, 1'!87. 
76. /d. at 4. 
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IV. Sierra Club v. Block: THE ToRTUROUS JouRNEY TO A 
RESERVED RIGHT 
A. Summary of the Case 
Sierra Club has been the center of much controversy. The district 
court divided the issues into three main questions. First, whether the 
Wilderness Act of 1964 effectively withdrew lands from the public do-
main and created a federal land reservation. All of the twenty-four Col-
orado wilderness areas at issue had been part of the national forest 
system, and thus had been validly reserved for forest purposes. There-
fore, the court had to decide whether the Wilderness Act of 1964 ef-
fected a second act of reservation for these lands. Second, assuming that 
the court found a reservation for wilderness purposes, did Congress in-
tend to reserve the unappropriated water. The court had to determine 
the purpose of the second reservation to shape the extent of the reserved 
right, in accordance with United States v. New Mexico. The third issue, 
not discussed here, was whether the federal administrative agencies had 
an affirmative duty to assert reserved water rights in state water 
courts. 77 
The court held that there was a second reservation of land under 
the Wilderness Act of 1964, and accordingly there was a reserved water 
right for the purposes of the Act. The court listed these purposes as 
conservation, recreation and aesthetic preservation.78 The plaintiffs 
achieved summary judgment on the first two issues.79 However, since 
the Wilderness Act did not contain a Congressional directive to the 
Forest Service, Park Service, or any other agency, the court found no 
duty to pursue the water rights in the state courts. This issue was criti-
cal to the opinion. The court found a duty to protect the water rights, 
although it recognized that the state court might not be the only forum 
or method through which the rights might be protected.80 The court 
offered no alternative courses of action. 
77. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 846 (D. Colo. 1985). For an excellent and 
comprehensive discussion of the duty to claim federal reserved water rights, see Abrams, Water in 
the \\'estern 1\'i/dnness: The Duty to Assert Reserved Water Rights, 1986 U. ILL L REV. 387, 
3R9 (1986); Marks, The Duty of Agencies to Assert Reserved Rights in Wilderness Areas, 14 
EcoLOGY L.Q. (,39 (1987). 
78. 622 F . .'iupp. at 8'i I. 
79. !d. at ~66. 
80. Id . . tt 864-65. 
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B. Reservations Accepted-The District Court's Logic 
A critical question facing Judge Kane was whether a second reser-
vation had been effected under the Wilderness Act. 81 A second reserva-
tion would potentially give rise to new water rights; rights implied in 
accordance with the New Mexico purposes test. The court concluded 
that the Wilderess Act developed a new class of lands. The Act prohib-
its any form of mineral rights, any commercial undertaking, or the con-
struction of permanent roads. No grazing is allowed, unless grazing 
rights were granted prior to wilderness designation. 82 The court found 
that this language pointed to an intent to withdraw the lands from the 
public domain.83 Other language, drawn from the Act and the legisla-
tive history convinced the court that Congress intended a reservation.84 
The defendants argued that the Wilderness Act was a land man-
agement scheme, similar to the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act 
(MUSYA), Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA), Taylor 
Grazing Act, and the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. 85 
The court, however, distinguished these various land management acts 
stating that none of them withdrew and reserved lands, as had the Wil-
derness Act. 88 In effect, since the court had construed a reservation, it 
could distinguish these other acts solely by virtue of it's construction of 
the Wilderness Act. 
Having concluded that a reservation was made, the court turned 
its attention to the intent of Congress to reserve water rights. Here the 
critical nature of the reservation construction is evident. If the Wilder-
ness Act did not create a new reservation, the water rights would have 
been dependent on the primary purposes of the earlier withdrawal and 
reservation as national forests, in accordance with the purposes test of 
United States v. New Mexico. 87 The district court eased around the 
81. Lands that are owned by the federal government, and were obtained from another sover-
eign body politic, are known as lands in the public domain. These lands become "reserved" when 
withdrawn by executive order or statute for a particular purpose. The act of withdrawal is a 
necessary prerequisite to reservation. Withdrawal removes the land from homesteading, mining 
and availability for sale. The wilderness areas in question in this case had been withdrawn and 
reserved as national forest lands. 
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4) (1982). 
83. 622 F. Supp. at 855. 
84. /d. at 856-57. 
85. /d. at 858 (citations omitted). 
86. /d .. 
87. 438 U.S. 696, 707-08 (1978). In this case the Supreme Court considered whether re-
served water rights were created for instream Oows, recreation and slockwatering in national for-
ests under the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act [MUSYA] of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1982). The 
government brief argued that the United States was entitled to a reserved water right for whatever 
purpose there may be in the land. Brief for the United States at 20, United States v. New Mexico. 
See supra text accompanying notes 54-63. 
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New Mexico decision by distinguishing the Wilderness Act from the 
MUSY A, noting that the MUSY A did not withdraw and reserve lands. 
Additionally, the court said that the MUSYA added to the primary 
purposes of national forests, while the Wilderness Act did not. 88 In 
New Mexico, the Supreme Court said that the MUSYA might well 
conflict with the primary purposes of national forests, to protect the 
watershed and insure a supply of timber. 89 The district court found 
that, unlike the MUSY A, the purposes of the Wilderness Act were har-
monious with the primary purposes of national forests. 90 Because of 
these factors the district court felt that Sierra Club was distinguishable 
from the New Mexico doctrine of prohibiting reserved rights for supple-
mental purposes. 
The question remains whether the wilderness reservation 
supercedes the forest reservation, or must be consistent with it. One 
might accept that the Wilderness Act does not conflict with the policy 
of preserving the waterflows. It is easy to conclude that wilderness sta-
tus protection of an area will lead to improved water quality for down-
stream users. The court cited a Congressional finding to this effect. 91 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the other primary pur-
pose of national forests, a supply of timber, with the stated purposes of 
the Wilderness Act. The district court attempted to perform this task in 
a footnote. 92 Judge Kane stated that clearly Congress was not referring 
to the purpose of providing a steady supply of timber, when it stated 
that nothing in the Wilderness Act shall be deemed to interfere with 
the primary purposes of national forests. He reaches this seemingly ir-
reconcilable conclusion by noting a Senate report which states that the 
particular wilderness lands in question had long been withdrawn from 
timber leasing.93 The court apparently recognizes its failure since sev-
eral pages of the opinion deal with reconciling the purpose of maintain-
ing water flows with the Wilderness Act, while the timber purpose was 
disposed of in the fine print. This leads to the conclusion that the court 
was unable to successfully confront this issue. 
Most importantly, by determining that the purposes of the Wil-
derness Act were consistent with the purposes of the Organic Act the 
court left unanswered whether dedication to wilderness purposes 
through the Wilderness Act of 1964 must be compatible with the pur-
poses of the original forest reservation. The court reasoned that since 
88. Sierra Club, 622 F. Supp. at 860. 
89. 438 U.S. at 714-15. 
90. 622 F. Supp. a, 859. 
91. /d., (citing S. REP. No. 109, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. at 15 (1963)). 
92. 622 F. Supp. at 860 n.l3. 
93. /d., (citing S. REP. No. 109, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. at 4 (1963)). 
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the purposes of the Wilderness Act did not conflict with the Organic 
Act, they could not be secondary.94 The Supreme Court in New Mexico 
held that the purposes of the MUSY A were secondary because they 
were not consistent with the Organic Act. 95 It does not follow, however, 
that all inconsistent purposes will be secondary in nature. 
C. Sierra Club Presented No justiciable Issue 
While this comment skirts the procedural issue of the duty to as-
sert reserved water rights,96 another procedural issue cannot be so 
lightly dismissed. There must be a case or controversy before a court 
can entertain litigation.97 If at some point during the litigation, the case 
is r_:ooted by resolution of the case or controversy, it must be dismissed 
without further proceedings.98 Sierra Club is a case where no real case 
or controversy, in the strict legal sense, was presented to the court. 
Those desiring to invoke the power of the federal courts ~ust al-
lege some tangible threatened or actual injury.99 However, the case was 
not brought as an action for declaratory judgment, and no allegations 
were made in the complaint of any potential harm to forest lands or 
wilderness lands. Since no allegations of injury were made which might 
be attributable to the primary defendants in the case, there was no con-
troversy to be decided. 100 
The court must hold some power to cure the alleged injury in or-
der to establish a case or controversy as envisioned in Article III of the 
United States Constitution. 101 Sierra Club recognized that it had no 
power to compel the federal defendants to take any action to claim re-
served water rights. 102 The court also held that failure to assert these 
rights was not an arbitrary or capricious abuse of administrative 
power,103 and thereby reviewable under the Administrative Procedures 
Act. 104 In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, Justice Marshall wrote that 
adjudication of rights which a court is powerless to enforce is tanta-
94. 622 F. Supp. at 859. 
95. 438 U.S. 696, 702 ( 1978). 
96. See supra note 77. 
97. Allen v. Wright, 468 C.S 737, 750 (1984). 
98. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 US 395, 401-02 (1975). 
99. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Litlleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1974)(citations omitted). 
100. Presumably the Sierra Club wished to establish the existence of federal reserved water 
rights for wilderness areas so that the rights might be sought in other adjudications involving 
wilderness areas. 
101. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,242 (1937) reh'g. denied 300 U.S. 
687. 
102. 622 F. Supp. at 864. 
103. !d. 
104. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (1982). This act allows judicial review of agency actions. 
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mount to an advisory opinion. 1011 Sierra Club unequivocally amounts to 
nothing more than an advisory opinion, since the court fully acknowl-
edged that it was impotent to fashion any relief. For that reason, the 
case should have never been considered. 
V. THE INT.ERIOR SoLICITOR's RESPONSE TO Sierra Club 
A. The K rulitz Opinion 
Under the Carter Administration, the Solicitor of the Interior De-
partment considered the reservation doctrine and wilderness areas in a 
formal opinion. 106 This opinion received cnttctsm from several 
quarters. 107 The analysis supporting the conclusion that the reservation 
doctrine may be applied to the Wilderness Act consumed a scant three 
paragraphs.108 
While Judge Kane did not cite the Krulitz Opinion in Si.erra 
Club, he did cite it in a subsequent supplemental decision. 109 It is the 
only other authority supporting the view in the Sierra Club decision. It 
does not contain any history of the reservation rights, other than desul-
tory references to major cases. It is not surprising, then, that it has been 
superceded and overturned by the present solicitor. 
B. The Tarr Opinion 
Sierra Club gives the legislative history great weight in determin-
ing congressional intent. It is apparent to a reader of the Tarr Opin-
ion110 that the district court's study of the legislative history of the Wil-
derness Act was sketchy, at best. The Tarr Opinion tracks the 
development of the reservation doctrine and federal water rights in gen-
eral. Particular detail is found in the discussion of the Wilderness Act's 
legislative history and related acts. Some have suggested that the opin-
105. 461 U.S. 95, 129 n.20 (1983)(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
106. 86 J.D. 553, 609 (1979)[Krulitz Opinion]. 
107. See, e.g., Waring & Samelson, Non-Indian Federal Reserved Water Rights, 58 DFN. 
L.J. 783, 792 (1981 ); Tarlock, Protection of Water Flows for National Parks, 22 LAND & 
WATER L. REV. 29, 44 (1987). 
108. The Krulitz Opinion was subsequently modified on January 16, 1981, 88 J.D. 253 
(1981)[Martz Opinion] (former Solicitor Martz later became kad counsel for the defendants in 
Sierra Club), September 11, 1981, 88 l.D. 1055 (1981)[Coldiron Opinion I], and February 16, 
1983, 90 J.D. 81 (1983)[Coldiron Opinion II]. The Martz Opinion concluded that neither the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1982), nor the Taylor Crazing 
Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 315o-1 (1982), authorized water appropriation except under normal state 
law procedures. The Coldiron Opinions arrived at substantially the same conclusion, applied to 
non-reserved rights. None of the subsequent modifications significantly deal with federal r~served 
rights in the wilderness context. 
109. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D Colo. 1987) (Sierra Club //). 
110. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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ion was crafted around a particular political philosophy, reflecting the 
views of the Reagan Administration. 111 The text of the opinion, how-
ever, does not impart the impression of a document drafted with a con-
clusion penned in advance of the research. 
1. Did Congress intend to create a federal reserved water right in 
the Wilderness Act? 
A major portion of the Tarr Opinion discusses § 4(d)(7) of the 
Wilderness Act, which provides: "nothing in this Chapter shall consti-
tute an express or implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal 
Government as to exemption from State water laws."112 This section 
was not mentioned in the Sierra Club decision. However, the govern-
ment relied on this section in a motion to reconsider summary judg-
ment. In Sierra Club v. Lyng (Sierra Club /1),113 the court considered 
the language of this section and concluded that it did not act to preclude 
a reserved water right. 114 Despite the government's urging, and the 
previously demonstrated willingness to rely on selected legislative com-
ments, the court failed to consider the vast and circuitous legislative 
history behind this short and seemingly innocuous section. 
Interestingly, in the entire Wilderness Act, water is mentioned 
only twice. First, Congress gives the President the discretion to imple-
ment water projects when truly needed.1111 The other reference is in § 
4(d)(7). Subsequent acts designating particular wilderness areas gener-
ally refer back to § 4(d)(7). 116 In the absence of a specific reservation of 
water rights in the legislation designating the wilderness area, and in 
light of the reference back to § 4(d)(7), the language of § 4(d)(7) 
should be seen as controlling. Therefore, undertaking a meticulous and 
painstaking search for the legislative intent is vital in this section, an 
element wholly absent from the reasoning of Sierra Club. 
While an advocate of the death of legalese might look at § 4(d)(7) 
and be repulsed, there appear's also to be a plain English meaning of 
this section. Congress neither created nor disclaimed any federal water 
rights for wilderness areas, purposefully adopting ambiguous language 
in § 4(d)(7). Study of the early history of the Wilderness Act bears out 
this conclusion. 
111. See, e.g., Leshy, Water and Wilderness/ Law and Politics, 23 LAND & WATER L. 
R~cv. 389, 398 (1988) 
112. 16 U.S.C § 1133(d)(6) (1982). 
113. /d. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987). 
114. 661 F. Supp. at 1502. 
115. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4) (1982). 
116. See, e.g., Arizona Wilderness Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1485 § IOI(b), (e); California Wil-
derness Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1619 § IOI(a). 
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As the bill was introduced, the congressional delegations from the 
western states were understandably concerned over the potential impact 
on existing water rights. This is illustrated by the following remarks 
offered by Senator Hubert Humphrey: 
Paragraph 5, the last in this section, contains language that is vital to 
our colleagues from the West. When the first wilderness bill was be-
ing discussed, some of its opponents charged that its enactment would 
change existing water laws and would deprive local communities of 
water, both domestic and irrigation. Although this certainly was not 
the intention of the sponsors, it has seemed necessary to insert a short 
sentence to remove any doubts. 117 [cites § 4( d)(7)] 
While one might hastily conclude that the western legislators of the day 
were overreacting, one need simply consider the history of water scar-
city in the West. It is also helpful to remember that the Wilderness Act 
was introduced shortly after the Supreme Court decided Pelton 
Dam. 118 Pelton Dam expanded the Winters reservation doctrine and 
was viewed as infringing on states' water allocation systems. There had 
been extensive hearings on legislation introduced to overrule Pelton 
Dam. 119 Indeed, the same Senate committee proposing the bill to over-
rule Pelton Dam considered the Wilderness Act. All this points to a 
Congress well-versed in current water issues and able to tackle the job 
of wilderness water rights in whatever manner it deemed appropriate. 
The original language of § 4(d)(7), proposed by the California 
Department of Water Resources, was more precise than the final lan-
guage.120 The history of the interchange of the California administra-
tors and the Senate committee is recorded in the hearings on the Wil-
derness Act, and cited extensively by the Tarr Opinion in support of 
the proposition that § 4(d)(7) precludes a federal reserved water 
right. 121 The first amendment proposed would have placed all unap-
propriated water within the wilderness area under the exclusive control 
of the appropriate state agency. 122 There was a danger, however, that a 
provision this broad might be interpreted to repudiate existing federal 
117. 104 CoNG. REc. 11,555 (1958)(emphasis altered from original). 
118. See Federal Power Comm. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955). 
119. Tarr Opinion, (citing Hearings on S. 863 before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Rec-
lamation of the Sen. Comm. on the Interior and Insular Affairs, in consideration of S. 863, 2. 
The Subcommittee there stated that the purpose of the bill was to overturn the Pelton Dam 
ruling). 
120. Representatives of the California Departments of Water Resources, Game and Fish, 
and Natural Resources testified before the Committee, all in support of some form of guarantee of 
the integrity of the state water rights system. 
121 See Tarr Opinion at 11, 12 (citing Hearings on S. /176 before the Senate Committee 
on the Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong., I st Sess., S-6, 281-89, 329-32 ( 1957)). 
122. /d. 
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water rights. As some of the proposed wilderness areas encroached on 
Indian reservations, this might also have opened the door to claims of 
treaty abrogation. 123 
The Tarr Opinion concludes that the language of § 4(d)(7) was 
included in direct response to the concerns of the western congressional 
delegations, already smarting at the bite of the Pelton Dam decision. 124 
The author characterized the section as a "disclaimer of interference 
with State or Federal water rights." 12 ~ 
Senator Church, while serving on the Senate Committee on the 
Interior, also interpreted § 4(d)(7) as not creating a reserved right. In 
the bill which set aside land for a wilderness area in Idaho, he noted 
that the bill repeated the language of the Wilderness Act of 1964, and 
stated "moreover, we desired to reiterate and underscore the jurisdiction 
of the State of Idaho over the water resources and fish and game within 
the wilderness areas and accomplished that by repeating the provisions 
of the 1964 act which relate to these issues."126 
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, containing similar language, fol-
lowed four years after the Wilderness Act. 127 This act also specified 
that the principles of water administration would not be altered by the 
act. Nonetheless, the act seems to create federal water rights. Notwith-
standing, the Senate Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, m 
reporting out the bill, said 
[The § 4(d)(7) parallel language] is intended by the Committee to 
preserve the status quo with respect to the law of water rights. No 
change is intended. The first sentence states that established principles 
of law will determine the Federal and State jurisdiction over the wa-
ters of a stream that is included in a wild river area. Those estab-
123. Tarr Opinion at 12 n.13. 
124. ld. at 13. 
125. /d. (citing Hearings on S. 174 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Interior and Insular 
Affairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. at 5 (1961 )). Several other public figures and organizations were 
quoted in statements that indicate a clear understanding that the Wilderness Act did not create a 
reserved water right. A representative of the National \Vildlife Federation stated that this section 
offered assurance that "no claim is made to exemption from State Water laws" in the wilderness 
areas. Hearings on S. 4028 before the Sen. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. 2 at 257 (1958). The Citizen's Committ~e on Natural Resources stated that "a special 
provision of the bill safeguards State water laws." Hearings on S. 174 at 275. The New York 
Conservation Council stated that "all existing rights ... will continue to be recognized, as will 
State water laws." /d. Such statements show that the Wilderness Act was to be construed in 
derogation of State water law. A view of reserved rights would simply be inconsistent with such 
construction. 
126. H. REP. No. 838, 2d Sess. 20 (1980). See also S. REP. No. 414, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
at 22 (1980), cited in Tarr Opinion at 15. This report stated that Section 7, which contained the 
duplicate language from § 4(d)(7), "further reiterates and underscores the jurisdiction of the State 
of Idaho over the water resources within the wilderness area." 
127. Act of October 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906. 
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lished principles of law are not modified. The third sentence states 
that with respect to possible exemption of the Federal Government 
from the State water laws the act is neither a claim or denial of ex-
emption. Any issue relating to exemption will be determined by estab-
lished principles of law as provided in the first sentence. 128 
2. Did Congress intend to abandon existing federal water rights 
under the Wilderness Act? 
In light of the statements made in support of passage of the Wil-
derness Act, as well as subsequent statements, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the Act was not intended to create a federal reserved 
water right. The converse must also be considered. Did Congress in-
tend to abandon any established federal water rights? Sierra Club con-
tains no analysis on this point. It again seems logical to rely on a plain 
English rendition of the section's meaning as to this question. 
The discussion in the foregoing section hints at the influence of 
California state officials in the drafting of § 4(d)(7). Senator 
Humphrey, sponsor of the Wilderness Act, stated that he gave "carte 
blanche" to Senator Kuchel of California to mold the bill to the satis-
faction of the California officials. 129 Despite this generous offer, it is 
clear that the final language was the product of compromise. Such a 
process indicates that elements of Congress were concerned with pre-
serving the extant federal water rights. 
The California version of § 4(d)(7) stated, "nothing in this act 
shall constitute an express or implied claim on the part of the United 
States for exemption from State water laws." The Department of Jus-
tice objected, concerned that this language 
exposed to loss, through appropriation by others under State law, all 
presently vested rights of the United States to the use of water on the 
Government's military establishments, national forests, Indian reser-
vations, national parks and monuments, and other reserved lands, ex-
cept in the fulfillment of treaty obligations in connection therewith is 
involved, should be noted. 130 
Thus, to satisfy Justice Department concerns, the words "or denial" 
were added and constituted the final language of the section. 131 A rep-
128. S. REP. 491, 90th Gong., 1st Sess. at 5 (1967). 
129. Letter from Senator Kuchel to Senator James Murry, April 4, 1958, cited in Tarr 
Opinion at 15. 
130. Hearings on S. 863 at 55, supra note 119 (remarks of the Assistant Attorney (;eneral 
for the Office of Legal Counsel). 
131. 104 CoNe. REc. 6343 (1958) (for reasons not entirely clear, a portion of the Committee 
report was read into the Congressional Record by Senator Richard Neuberger.) 
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resentative of the Trustees for Conservation who was present during 
the relevant debates confirmed this conclusion. 132 
VI. New Mexico v. Molybdenum Corporation of America: A CASE 
IN CoNFLICT WITH Sierra Club 
While the Tarr Opinion presents a comprehensive recitation of the 
legislative history of the Wilderness Act of 1964, and reaches logical 
conclusions, its impact is limited by the controlling weight granted to 
an opinion of the United States Attorney General. 133 A case is cur-
rently under consideration in federal district court for New Mexico 
which directly contradicts the Sierra Club opinion, New Mexico v. Mo-
lybdenum Corp. of America. 134 While a final, appealable order has not 
yet been entered, preliminary rulings indicate that the final judgment 
will hold that there are no federal reserved water rights under the Wil-
derness Act of 1964. 
In Molybdenum Corp., the federal government asserted reserved 
water rights under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Wilderness Act of 
1964, Organic Act of 1897, MUSY A, and for properly perfected ap-
propriations under New Mexico state law. 1311 This case is similar to the 
adjudication for the Beaver Dam Mountains Wilderness Area in that 
all claims have been considered and decided, except those of the federal 
government, and once again it is the federal government that is delay-
ing an adjudication that has been ongoing for several years (1 0 years in 
the New Mexico case). The court referred these claims to a Special 
Master for evaluation. 136 
The claims in this case present a true drama, as the United States' 
132. Tarr Opinion at 19 (quoting Howard Zahniser, Washington Representative, Trustees 
for Conservation, in a report issued by Zahniser to his organization, an abstract of which is found 
at 104 CON(;. Rtc. 6343 (1958). In the report, Zahniser states: 
The [California] Department also recommended the insertion of dn added Special sec-
tion which would provide that "nothing in this Act shall constitute an express or im-
plied claim on the part of the United St ·•es for exemption from State Water laws." In 
line with suggestions received in the course of the consultation regarding the proposed 
new section, the words "or denial" were also added to avoid an [sic] possible misin-
terpretation on the other hand and specifically to anticipate and avoid objection on 
the part of the Department of justice (emphasis in original)). 
133. Although the Tarr Opinion was authored by the Solicitor of the Interior Department, it 
was approved by, and in effect adopted as the opinion of the U.S. Allorney General by his leller 
dated Julv 26, 1988. 
134. :--iew Mexico v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, No. 9780C (D. 1\;.M. 1988). This case 
involves an adjudication of water rights to the flow of the Red River. 
135. New Mexico v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, No. 9780C (D. N.M. 1988), Report of 
the Special ;-..Jaster (filed March 27, 1987) at 4-6, Report of the Special Master affirmed by the 
Court, February 2, 1988, Motion for Reconsideration denied June 2, 1988. 
136. Jd. 
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claims are contested by, among others, several farm groups representing 
poor farmers. The farmers testified that their wells often become dry. 
The government's representative testified of increased need for snow-
making at a ski resort located on federal lands. 137 All of the farmers' 
ditch systems have appropriative claims perfected under state law 
which predate perfected federal appropriative rights. 
The Special Master allowed federal claims properly perfected 
under applicable state law and claims advanced under a theory of res-
ervation by the ~rganic Act of 1897. 138 However, after consideration 
and rejection of Sierra Club, the Special Master denied claims under 
reservation of wilderness lands, wild rivers and MUSY A. 139 Section 
4(d)(7) of the Wilderness Act and the identical language contained in 
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act140 were cited as evidence of a lack of 
congressional intent to reserve water rights. 141 The report was adopted 
by the district court without modification. 
Perhaps by the time that Molybdenum Corp. is final the appeal of 
Sierra Club will have been decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. In any circumstance, the Justice Department will not likely ap-
peal the almost-certain verdict in Molybdenum Corp. in light of the 
Tarr Opinion and confirmation by the Attorney General. In this re-
spect, the Tarr Opinion directly impacts on important water rights 
litigation. 
VII. Ex PosT FACTO DIVINATION oF CoNGRESSIONAL WILL 
A. A Reconsideration of Wilderness Purposes 
As discussed above, it is critical to a reserved water right that there 
be a withdrawal and reservation, and a congressional intent to reserve a 
water right to meet a primary purpose for the designated reservation. 142 
Sierra Club found both in the case of wilderness lands, a finding now 
seriously questioned by the more complete legislative historical analysis 
of the Tarr Opinion. This lapse of Sierra Club prescribes an examina-
tion of the purposes implicated in a ''rilderness reservation. 
Judge Kane viewed the intent of the Wilderness Act of 1964 in its 
entire context to arrive at the conclusion that the purposes of the Act 
were not supplementary or in derogation of the purposes of the Organic 
137. !d. at 7-H. 
13H. !d. at 'i. 
139. !d. at 10. 
140. 16 U.S.C. § 1284 (1982). 
141. Report of Special Master, supra note 135 at 10. 
142. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (197H). See supra notes 54-63 and 
accompanying text. 
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Act of 1897.143 He failed, nonetheless, to cite and distinguish the plain 
language of § 4(d)(6) of the Act, which states "the purposes of this 
chapter are hereby declared to be within and supplemental to the pur-
poses for which national forests and units of the national park and na-
tional wildlife refuge systems are established and administered .... " 144 
While criticism of the court's construction of the Act may be unfair, in 
light of stated objectives such as "preservation and protection of ... 
wilderness" 14 ~ and "retaining [the] primeval character and influ-
ence . . . for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recrea-
tion,"146 the court's omission of the section cited above indicates an ana-
lytical weakness in ignoring the germane legislative history. 
The Tarr Opinion cites several other provisions of the Wilderness 
Act which seem to indicate that the Act was nothing more than a com-
plex system of management to be imposed on wilderness lands. No con-
flict exists here between this goal and the original concerns of conserva-
tionists troubled by the administrative, and therefore reversible, nature 
of wilderness lands established under early regulations. 147 The opinion 
concludes that wilderness land designated under the Wilderness Act of 
1964 are designated for purposes secondary to the uses of the land pre-
viously reserved for other purposes. 148 
Significant statements of prominent senators during consideration 
of the Act bolster this conclusion. Senator McGovern stated that the 
proposed act merely "establishes the criteria under which our wilder-
ness areas will be managed. " 149 Committee hearings on the bill also 
show that the proposed act was not intended to create new and distinc-
tive purposes for the land designated as wilderness areas. 150 
B. Toward Direction and Purpose 
Possibly the most apparent question is "Why did Congress not 
simply create a reserved right?" Certainly, the power exists. The 
United States Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate prop-
erty owned by the United States. 1111 The threshold inquiries center on 
congressional intent. The route to ascertaining intent is that most di-
143. 622 F. Supp. 842, 855-56 (1985) 
144. 16 LJ.S.C:. § 1133(a) (1982) (emphasis added). 
145. 16 USC§ 1131(a) (1982). 
146. /d. at (c). 
147. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
148. Tarr Opinion at 33. 
149. 109 C:oNG. REC. 5942-43 (1963) (emphasis added). 
150. See, e.g., 104 CoNt;. REC. 11,555 (1958) (The wilderness hill is in harmony with a 
multiple use policy for national forests). 
15 l. US. CoNST. art. IV, § 3. 
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rect: speaking the mind of Congress. 
Two answers immediately respond to the inquiry. The obvious, 
one would suppose for a body that faces election biannually, is politics. 
President Jimmy Carter lost his reelection bid to Ronald Reagan, gar-
nering no electoral votes west of the Mississippi. Some observers attri-
bute this result to the "hit list," a list of projects to be cut that included 
western water conservation projects. The defendant-intervenors of Si-
erra Club reads like a "Who's Who" of powerful western lobbying 
groupsY'2 No elected representative relishes an imbroglio with the 
heavy campaign contributors and influential groups. 
The second answer may be that no one thought about water 
rights. While this is possible for eastern congressional representatives, it 
seems very unlikely for western representatives who are politically in-
culcated with water rights disputes. Some might even be so steeped in 
federal supremacy as to believe that no state could successfully chal-
lenge the assertion of a federal water right. As for all others, the prior 
answer seems appropriate. 
At least one wilderness-designating statute contains an express res-
ervation of a federal water right for the wilderness area. In the bill 
designating the El Malpais Wilderness in New Mexico/53 the authors 
include a provision reserving the minimum amount necessary to accom-
plish the purposes of the El Malpais National Monument and Wilder-
ness Area. 154 The bill was introduced by members of the New Mexico 
Congressional delegation. To date, no wilderness bills have been passed 
without full support of the congressional delegation of the state in 
which the subject area is located. Thus, it is significant that this lan-
guage originated with the bill's sponsors. 
The author proposes the following language to abate further wil-
derness reserved water rights controversy, insofar as any debate con-
cerning the existence of these rights. 
By passage of this act, Congress expressly reserves the rights to unap-
propriated waters appurtenant to the designated wilderness area. The 
amount reserved shall be limited to that necessary to the propagation 
and preservation of wildlife and aquatic wildlife within the area. No 
intent of exemption from existing or future water allocation compacts 
is intended or contained in this act. Adjudication of quantification 
shall be completed through the courts of the state in which the water 
flow or drainage area or groundwater source is contained, and the 
!52. The intervenors included, am,mg others, the Colorado Farm Bureau, Colorado Water 
Congress, Mountain States Legal Foundation, National Cattlemen's Association, Colorado Water 
Conservation Board, and the Colorado Cattlemen's Association. 
153. 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-49(a)(b) (1988). 
154. !d. 
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McCarran Amendment155 shall apply. 
Such language would be consonant with the New i'vlexico purposes test 
and eliminate doubt concerning the purpose upon which the water 
right is based. Further, traditional deference to state water proceedings 
is maintained through state jurisdiction over quantification. 
VII. CoNCLUSION 
Sierra Club v. Block demonstrates the inadequacy of selective ap-
plication of legislative history. The Tarr Opinion reflects that the au-
thors and supporters of the Wilderness Act of 1964 envisioned no ex-
pansion of the Winters doctrine into wilderness lands. The Tarr 
Opinion also establishes that the purposes of the Wilderness Act of 
1964 did not supersede the primary purposes of the Organic Act of 
1897, to preserve stream flows and ensure a supply of timber. 
The Beaver Dam Mountains Wilderness Area may be the site of 
the next reserved rights battle. 156 It appears that the proponents of wil-
derness reserved rights are now faced with the Tarr Opinion as a po-
tentially mortal wound, if the Justice Department heeds its instruction. 
The adjudication in the Virgin River Drainage, now halted by the wil-
derness reserved right question, may be quickly concluded. Perhaps 
then the Beaver Dam Wilderness Area will be remembered as the 
groundbreaking of cooperation between the environmental advocates, 
the government and the opponents of wilderness reserved rights. 
The controversy over federal reserved water rights may be intelli-
gently resolved through legislative language that would preserve state 
administration over water while promoting wilderness preservation. 
The reservation doctrine should not be applied to wilderness area water 
rights, even though the lands may have been previously reserved for 
other purposes. The administration in the vast tracts of wilderness ar-
eas is best left to the individual states, where time-proven water admin-
istration may effectively allocate the precious resource of water. The 
Sierra Club and similar advocacy groups should best serve their constit-
uency by promoting remedial legislative language, and letting the Si-
erra Club controversy die a natural death. 
Kenneth R. Wallentine 
155. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982). This amendment waives immunity from suit for water 
adjudications. 
156. Not only does the Beaver Dam Mountains Wilderness present a fertile battleground. 
but an Interior Department offical (declining to be named) informed the author that the attorneys 
for the Sierra Club have discussed such an action. 
